Normative/ Normativity

Social Justice Usage

Source: Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. Routledge, 1993, pp. xi–xii.

Is there a way to link the question of the materiality of the body to the performativity of gender? And how does the category of “sex” figure within such a relationship? Consider first that sexual difference is often invoked as an issue of material differences. Sexual difference, however, is never simply a function of material differences which are not in some way both marked and formed by discursive practices. Further, to claim that sexual differences are indissociable from discursive demarcations is not the same as claiming that discourse causes sexual difference. The category of “sex” is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has called a “regulatory ideal.” In this sense, then, “sex” not only functions as a norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce—demarcate, circulate, differentiate— the bodies it controls. Thus, “sex” is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this materialization takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated practices. In other words, “sex” is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize “sex” and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms.

New Discourses Commentary

Normativity is the central problematic meant to be addressed by queer Theory. The concept of “normativity,” which means roughly “the state of being normative,” is a slightly complicated idea in the way queer Theorists (etc.) use it because it is based in double meanings of the terms “norm,” “normal,” and “normative,” which it is clearly related to. Understanding normativity in the relevant context requires exploring these related terms.

Something being normative is, in a descriptive sense, being something within the main part of a (statistical) distribution, rather than being a (rare) tail-end behavior. For example, most men have a masculine gender identity, and most women have a feminine gender identity. In that sense, it is normal for men to identify as masculine and women to identify as feminine, or, put in the terminology of Critical Social Justice, being cisgender is the norm. Being normative also has a meaning that carries a (usually morally) prescriptive understanding, in which one should be expected to conform to the relevant prevailing descriptive norms. For example, codes of behavior—usually unwritten and socially enforced—that indicate the range of acceptable behaviors define those behaviors as normative to that context. Thus, that which is “normative” is that which is usual and that which is expected because it is usual. Strictly speaking, “normative” usually implies this moral meaning, though the dual meaning (and related double meanings of “normal” and “norm”) are the site of most of the productive activity of queer Theory and some related Theories of Critical Social Justice.

Queer Theory and related Theoretical approaches like disability studies, gender studies, and fat studies (which tend to draw upon queer Theory somewhat extensively) regard the social pressure associated with normative behavioral mores (i.e., the expectation to be “normal”) to be a form of unjust systemic power that needs to be disrupted, dismantled, deconstructed, and, especially, subverted. In the Theoretical sense, then, “normativity” refers to the systems of oppressive power that constrains the “potentialities of being,” as postmodern philosopher Michel Foucault had it, for people who identify outside of the “normal” range (see also, self-identification). Normativity, then, is the social force that enforces social norms and thus the acceptable range of behavior and identity. It is thus considered a form of privilege to be in the “normal” range of some type of normativity.

For example, in circumstances where heterosexuality is considered normal—and here the double-meaning language game becomes apparent to most readers, in that most people are heterosexual and yet this might be (reasonably or even very unjustly) expected—a system of power called “heteronormativity” is said to prevail, from which arises much of the basis for homophobia, which enforces it. In like fashion, there is cisnormativity (that it is usual and, perhaps, expected that people will have the gender identity corresponding to their sex) enforced by transphobia, ablenormativity (that it is useful and, perhaps, expected or preferable for people to be able-bodied unless there is some known disability present) enforced by ableism and disableism, and thinormativity (that it is usual and, perhaps, expected or preferable for people to be a healthy weight rather than overweight or obese) enforced by fatphobia (see also, humannormativity).

The nature of this language game is worth identifying more clearly because it is the primary source of activism within these Theories that confuses people about them. Take the issue of “heteronormativity.” It is a basic fact of human biology that while some people are homosexual, a wide majority is heterosexual. In that sense, it is normal (in the statistically descriptive sense) to be heterosexual, so a descriptive form of “heteronormativity” definitely describes the human condition. Upon meeting someone you do not know, it is a reasonable expectation that they are probably heterosexual, and it would not be unusual to act accordingly until otherwise informed. This, though, is considered a “heteronormative” assumption that allegedy does harm to homosexual, bisexual, and otherly-sexual people, perhaps in the form of constant exposure to microaggressions said to be caused by people proceeding as though they are (probably) straight until otherwise informed or corrected on the point. Many people who do not subscribe to Critical Social Justice ideology see this claim as indicative of unreasonable hypersensitivity due to the statistical realities and, usually, the lack of bigotry in any mistakes that are made (see also, impact versus intent). (Incidentally, the previous sentence would also be considered to be based in heteronormativity because it would be read as implying that people who are not heterosexual have some obligation to have to deal with people assuming that they’re in the wide statistical majority when that may not be true—which is even more salient in the case of cisnormativity, which is far more statistically reasonable even if still presumptive.)

Of course, it is accurate that in many times and places throughout history, a stronger form of heteronormativity has been maintained and enforced than we would recognize today. It would expect people to be heterosexual and perhaps even attempt to force them to be that way, either through social enforcement or more drastic measures. It would also see using terms like “gay” as a slur as being acceptable and, particularly, indicative of a wrong or weak way to be (in context) a man. This sort of heteronormativity would reify an expectation connected to the statistical norm into a properly normative circumstance, and it would probably regard sexual orientations other than heterosexuality as abnormal and, perhaps, in need of punishment or correction. The double meaning of the normativity within heteronormativity arises from this state of affairs. It equivocates upon the morally salient accusation that it is abnormal—with all of the pejorative connotation of that word intentionally intact—to be anything other than heterosexual, when, in fact, the belief may just be statistical. or to proceed upon the default assumption that a given person is likely to be heterosexual unless they’ve indicated otherwise.

This enforced normativity was, of course, the state of affairs until quite recently in liberal societies and frequently remains the case outside of them, but following the liberal activism of Gay Pride and the marriage equality movement, being homosexual is also, for the most part, considered to be a normal variation within human sexuality. Thus, descriptive heteronormativity does not necessarily imply prescriptive heternormativity, but queer Theory tends to insist that it always does and that it is problematic and harmful, possibly even violent even to believe that most people are heterosexual (see also, violence of categorization). All of this normal/normative equivocating language game transfers to the other forms of normativity, mutatis mutandis.

This double-meaning game is engaged because it is productive of queer identity politics. By accusing people of a moral wrong for making a reasonable assumption, activists are able to make a great deal of headway in shaming people into compliance with their underlying ideology. That this equivocation is productive of queer identity politics implies, though, that it, itself, gets enforced in those activist enclaves and the surrounding and targeted “adjacent” communities. For example, though this is not widely known in the general population, queer Theorists and activists tend to target homosexuals and bisexuals who are “straight passing,” or those who marry, for the crime of “normalizing” homosexuality and thus, paradoxically, for making it more normative (accepted) in society. Marriage equality and straight passing (not being visibly and politically queer while being gay, lesbian, or bi) are therefore resisted by queer Theorists because they increase the scope of (hetero)normativity.

It is in this regard that it is most obvious that the purpose of queer Theory is to resist normativity—that is, anything being regarded as “normal”—and to do so on principle, not necessarily to obtain greater rights or acceptance (say, for LGBTQ people, fat people, disabled people, etc.). Acceptance and rights would make LGBTQ people more normal, bringing them within the realm of normativities in society, and that makes those identities unproductive for queer identity politics. Thus, movements (like marriage equality) that would (prescriptively) normalize gender and sexual minorities are vigorously rejected by the more radical queer Theorists.

This last point about queer Theory and normativity bears drawing out, then. In essence, queer Theory has the ability to problematize anything by pointing out how it “upholds normativity,” whether that’s normativity in some social sense as we usually conceive of it or even normativity of how we might use language (see also, linguistic justice) or even think. Anything that can be considered normal in any regard whatsoever can be criticized for “being normative” within queer Theory (even queer Theory itself). Indeed, as we have just seen, even that which was once “queer” and became “normal” must be criticized as such, thus guaranteeing not only a relentless war on the normal but also one that takes the form of a perpetual revolution (see also, aufheben and dialectic). On the one hand, this broadens the scope of queer Theory and queering to literally everything, including itself, and, on the other hand, it often has the impact of rendering queer Theory mostly unintelligible, ridiculous, and useless.

Seeing normativity as a problematic within Theory ultimately has a few origins. There is, of course, the genuine point that is being made that the normal can become the normative and thus create injustice (see also, fertile fallacy and alchemy). Within Critical Theory, this is taken to a particular extreme and is usually interpreted through the doctrine of false consciousness and internalization of dominance and oppression (compare, critical consciousness and consciousness raising). Under this doctrine, the systems of power that define society are believed to be accepted uncritically (double meaning on “critical”), and thus a normative framework for society (the “status quo”) is established and maintained by the general unawareness of the people participating in it. In postmodernism, normativity has a similar understanding but is generally believed to be “discursively maintained,” which is to say that it’s a product of beliefs people accept (again, uncritically) based on how things are talked about and what the limits of acceptable discourse define in that regard (see also, Foucauldian, Derridean, and Butlerian). Under this doctrine, which the Woke combine with the false consciousness doctrine of Critical Theory, people are socialized into performing various social roles (including those of sex, gender, and sexuality) based upon how people speak about those issues (see also, regulatory fiction, performativity, gender performativity, discursive aggression; applied postmodernism; critical constructivism; social constructivism, and social construction). It also has roots in feminism, which has long been concerned with how normative expectations interact with gender and sex roles (see also, gender critical).

Related Terms

Ableism; Ablenormativity; Alchemy; Applied postmodernism; Aufheben; Butlerian; Cisgender; Cisnormativity; Community; Consciousness raising; Critical; Critical consciousness; Critical constructivism; Critical Theory; Deconstruction; Derridean; Dialectic; Disability studies; Disableism; Discourse; Discursive aggression; Dismantle; Disrupt; Equality; False consciousness; Fat studies; Fatphobia; Feminism; Fertile fallacy; Foucauldian; Gender; Gender critical; Gender identity; Gender performativity; Gender studies; Harm; Hegemony; Heteronormativity; Homophobia; Humannormativity; Identity politics; Impact versus intent; Injustice; Internalized dominance; Internalized oppression; Language game; Liberal; Liberationism; Linguistic justice; Man; Microaggression; Norm; Normal; Oppression; Performativity; Perpetual revolution; Postmodern; Power (systemic); Privilege; Problematic; Problematize; Queer; Queer Theory; Radical; Regulatory fiction; Self-identification; Sex; Sexuality; Social Justice; Social construction; Social constructivism; Socialization; Status quo; Straight passing; Subversion; System, the; Theory; Thinormativity; Transphobia; Violence; Violence of categorization; Woke/Wokeness; Woman

Additional Examples

Source: Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge, 1990, pp. xiii–xiv.

I belabor this point because some queer theorists have drawn an analytic distinction between gender and sexuality, refusing a causal or structural link between them. This makes good sense from one perspective: if what is meant by this distinction is that heterosexual normativity ought not to order gender, and that such ordering ought to be opposed, I am firmly in favor of this view. If, however, what is meant by this is that (descriptively speaking), there is no sexual regulation of gender, then I think an important, but not exclusive, dimension of how homophobia works is going unrecognized by those who are clearly most eager to combat it. It is important for me to concede, however, that the performance of gender subversion can indicate nothing about sexuality or sexual practice. Gender can be rendered ambiguous without disturbing or reorienting normative sexuality at all. Sometimes gender ambiguity can operate precisely to contain or deflect non-normative sexual practice and thereby work to keep normative sexuality intact. Thus, no correlation can be drawn, for instance, between drag or transgender and sexual practice, and the distribution of hetero-, bi-, and homo-inclinations cannot be predictably mapped onto the travels of gender bending or changing.

Revision date: 4/5/21

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James Lindsay